Powered By Blogger

Sunday, June 12, 2011

Ivory Coast: Ouattara Faces His First Major Challenge

April 28, 2011

As is to be expected, those who live by the sword will definitely perish by the sword. In life, it is patently clear that what you love is what will kill you. Ibrahim Coulibaly, leader of the so-called militia group (Invisible Commandos) has been killed by forces of the country's new President, Alassane Ouattara.
He was killed in an offensive on Wednesday, a Defence Ministry spokesman (Captain Alla Kouakou Leon) told Reuters (BBC news, April 28, 2011).

Coulibaly loved fighting and died fighting. As leader of the militia group, he had mobilized the Commandos to help Mr. Ouattara gain control of parts of Abidjan during a post-poll dispute. 
But they had since fallen out and their respective forces clashed on Wednesday in the city Abidjan.
Coulibaly, who had said he wanted recognition for his role in overthrowing Mr. Gbagbo, had sought an audience with Mr. Ouattara. But he refused a presidential order to disarm beforehand.
Seeing him as a renegade, the government sought to eliminate that threat and its forces launched an offensive in Abidjan's northern Abobo district to dislodge Mr Coulibaly's forces.
His death at the hands of the pro-Ouattara forces raises intriguing concerns. It is clear that the pro-Ouattara forces are now turning against each other, while Gbagbo loyalists on the run are poised to start their own brand of trouble. The situation in the Ivory Coast is still volatile and will be the main problem to test the resolve of the Ouattara government. 
In one of my articles assessing the immediate tasks facing Ivory Coast's new government, I identified insecurity as a major one for Alassane Ouattara to handle tactically if he wants to stabilize that country and prepare good conditions for a smooth administration.
Here is what I said in part: “Granted that the Republican Front that launched the lightning assault on the Ivorian regular security set-up to prepare the grounds for the removal of Gbagbo from office is well-established on the ground, it is already clear that two parallel security systems are in contention in the country. Ouattara will have a tedious task streamlining this security situation.
Indeed, it is not immediately clear what plans there may be for elements of the Republican Front to be resettled smoothly. Whether these rebel forces will be integrated into the regular security set-up or whether the latter will be drastically purged to remove the pro-Gbagbo elements whose resistance or support for Gbagbo has torn the country apart all this while is a major problem.”
The major threat to confirm my initial apprehensions has emerged just two weeks after the ouster of Laurent Gbagbo. The sporadic exchange of gun-fire between the government's forces and the militiamen of the Invisible Commandos group poses the first serious security danger to Ouattara's administration.
These were the very forces that had led the lightning attack on the traditional Ivorian security forces to pave the way for what would eventually install Ouattara in office.
Thus, this eruption of in-fighting among the pro-Ouattara forces is a serious problem that must be immediately tackled with resolute decisiveness before it degenerates into guerrilla warfare or any other form of armed rebellion or anarchy to deepen the Ivorian crisis and extend beyond the country's borders to inflame the entire West African sub-region.
Furthermore, with so many known and unknown elements wielding all kinds of weapons in the system, the danger is apparent that they will resort to anti-social activities such as armed robbery, murder, rape, or any other act to threaten the security of the country.
With Gbagbo's armed supporters still at large and roaming areas that they regard as their safe havens, the situation seems to be really frightening.
Thus, we see the Ouattara government faced with many problems already:
i.                    How to flawlessly redefine and rebuild the traditional security apparatus to serve national   
       interests ;
ii.                  How to find ways to appease the fighters who brought Ouattara to power by either
       integrating them into the traditional security apparatus or redeploying them into
       productive sectors of the economy to make a living; and
iii.                How to look for ways to mop up the scattered Gbagbo supporters still wielding weapons
       and roaming civilian-populated areas. 
How to solve these problems is not yet known but Ouattara is expected to handle the matter carefully so as not to worsen the dicey situation that his struggle for the Presidency created for the country. If he fails to balance the equation properly, he will have sleepless nights and end up regretting being where Fate has brought him. 
he chips seem to be falling in place already for us to know the consequences of such morbid desire for power.
It is intriguing to learn that the very security forces that obeyed Gbagbo's orders to resist Ouattara's claim to the Presidency should now be fighting on Ouattara's orders to subdue the very forces that helped him secure his hold on power.
In this sense, then, the problem for Ouattara seems to be beyond immediate comprehension or solution. How will those forces that fought his battle for him now relate to him? Will they regard him as trustworthy enough to continue supporting?
Or will they turn coat and do to Ouattara what disaffected political or military supporters usually do, that is, turn full circle to regard Ouattara as an enemy to eliminate?
The situation is frightening and needs a careful handling.
Now, Ibrahim Coulibaly is described as a “renegade warlord.” He had been a staunch fighter for Ouattara but seemed to fall out of favour when Ouattara sought to streamline the security situation by ordering his forces to disarm and return to the north.
Then, Coulibaly suddenly became a threat. He was said to have died in an offensive launched by the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) to remove all roadblocks and built by his men fighting in Abobo and PK18 Anyama.
Coulibaly and his forces had settled in the Yopougon area. Just a few days ago, he had said that he wanted to be compensated for his role in removing Gbagbo from office. He even indicated that his forces were preparing to obey Ouattara's orders; but the offensive ended it all for him and six others of the FRCI, leaving many others wounded.
This controversy will definitely not bode well for the country, especially considering the fact that Ouattara's victory doesn't necessarily mean a reunification of the North with the South. The country is still divided with those in the northern part still resentful of their compatriots down south who have relegated them to the backwoods of the Ivorian national politics and resources.
The anger in them will not abate easily; and now that fighters from the North are being treated this way, more trouble should be expected.
It may be too early for anybody to expect that the dust in the country will settle down within just two weeks after Gbagbo's overthrow or that Ouattara can immediately restore normalcy to the beleaguered country and populace.
The harm that the feud between him and Gbagbo created will take long to repair. That is why Ouattara must ensure that he doesn't become heavy-handed all too soon. He needs to be more diplomatic in handling affairs, his government being too “young” in office to know exactly what to do to stabilize the country.
France and the UN might be willing collaborators in his struggle for power but will not be his bed-fellow in looking for solutions to the country's problems. They will leave him in the lurch when he most needs their support to settle in the groove.
Then, they will not hesitate to find fault with him and begin looking for a replacement (a willing tool) to use against him when they see the need for it.
Neither should Ouattara think that the ECOWAS will step in to give him the input that he needs to function well. All that he should expect from ECOWAS is empty political rhetoric, which won't help him solve any problem on the ground. That's how African bureaucracies behave.
Ouattara must know that fact and turn to his own compatriots to look for solutions that will bring the country back on its feet. It means being cautious in handling problems of the sort that his own forces have started creating. He must tread cautiously so he doesn't create more internal enemies for himself.
The Ivorian citizens already have too many problems to contend with and don't need any further traumatizing misjudgements from by their own government.
Indeed, if Ouattara chooses to pacify the different militia groupings that have paved the way for him to be in power, he will have to consider integrating those of them with reliable skills and good character into the mainstream national security apparatus.
He has to pick a leaf from Ghana to determine how to integrate those with military skills (acquired from their operations since 2002 when they helped Guilaume Soro to secure the North).
Although not regarded as a fighting militia force, the so-called “commandos” (members of the 64 Infantry Battalion) who operated under Jerry Rawlings' PNDC were smoothly absorbed into the Ghana Armed Forces after re-training to sharpen their skills for them to fit into the conventional military apparatus.
They are not known to have caused trouble thereafter. It's a lesson on how to fuse the unconventional security structure with the traditional one that other African countries must learn from. And the Ivory Coast's situation is ripe for such an approach to forestall further disaster.
These militia elements already have what it takes to do security work and must not be flushed out just like that; else, they will become implacably angry and misuse their skills and access to weapons to terrorize their compatriots, which will make the country ungovernable for Ouattara.
What has happened to result in Coulibaly's death at the hands of the Ouattara forces is regrettable but a necessary end to someone who wanted to establish his own power structure to confront the overarching national security interests. Such is the inevitable end of those who live by the sword.
But Ouattara has a lot to learn from this happening to be able to stamp his authority on the fractured country that he now presides over. He must solve this security problem and eliminate conditions that are likely to spawn others in future.
It is only then that he can normalize the situation and use his political experience and administrative acumen to justify why he fought Gbagbo to become the Ivory Coast's President. 

No comments:

Post a Comment